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A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the "hip flask case" brings to the fore an important
consideration no matter what view one may hold regarding the
law or facts before the court. In deciding the case the Supreme
Court did so without rendering a written decision setting forth
its reasoning and explaining the principles upon which the cause
turned and it is that point that elicits our interest rather than
the disposal of the propositions argued.
When it is remembered that we depend upon the decisions
of the court for the law regarding constitutional matters, the
danger of having a court that merely decides in favor of one or
the other of the litigants and goes no further becomes real. How
the law student, or the attorney, is to know how far these prin-
ciples are to be carried, or even upon what considerations the
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care was decided; if the justices merely blow a whistle or give
a signal of their approval- or. disapproval much in the manner of
a referee in a game, is beyond our comprehension.
The decision handed down last Thfirsday is, to the. best of
our knowledge, the second one in which the United States Sup-
reme court when dealing with a new and important mattdr re-
fused or abstained from disclosing its reasoning to the people.
In the great majority of cases the constitutional principle in-
volved tare clearly set forth, and are then there to serve as a
guide. The first example of deciding without giving reasoning
was given in the old prohibition cases. (253 U. S. 350.) That the
procedure was considered new at that time was admitted by Justice
McKenna who then added that the innovation "would decrease the
literature of the court if it did not increase its lucidity".
It happens, however, that it is not the bulk of the court's
literature that interests us, but rather, the lucidity. It is vastly
more important to know where we can go to get the law than to
compress the number of pages or even volumes of the Supreme
Court Reporter. From the standpoint of the law student, this
proposition of having the court merely say les or no, will leave
him at a total loss to describe the principle involved or to form
any opinion of what the law on the matter really is.
Nor was this the manner in which the constitutional law of the
nation was built up. The decisions of John Marshall abound
with constitutional law. They went further than to merely -af-
firm or deny. In the case of Chief Justice Taney and the court
that rendered the famous Dredd Scott decision, the ideal that
tie court should present its reasonings finds excellent exemplific-
ation. In that cause, the justices felt that the country was en-
titled to the reasons for its holdings although giving them was
equivalent to waving a red flag in the face of a bull. They were
not so tender with regard to adding to the literature of the
Supreme Court but they did not conribute to its lucidity. Such
a stand would be a more creditable one for the present court to
assume.
-J. P. M.
